Article 324 of the Criminal Procedure Law (LeCrim) represents a fundamental pillar within the Spanish criminal process by regulating the time limits for instruction—that is, the maximum period within which the investigating judge must conclude the investigation of the alleged criminal acts. Historically, the LeCrim of 1882, which has served as the basis for the criminal procedural system in Spain for over a century, lacked clear and precise regulation regarding instruction periods. This allowed criminal investigations to be prolonged indefinitely for decades, resulting in a direct impact on fundamental rights such as the right to a trial without undue delays (Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution) and effective judicial protection.
This regulatory gap caused the instruction phases to extend unchecked, generating severe consequences both for the investigated individuals, who remained in a state of legal uncertainty for long periods, and for the victims and society, who experienced delayed access to justice. The lack of a concrete time limitation, coupled with resource shortages in some courts, fostered the phenomenon of undue delays, criticized by both doctrine and jurisprudence.
The absence of precise time limits in the criminal instruction phase in Spain also contrasted with international trends in comparative law and with the standards established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In this regard, the ECHR has repeatedly pointed out that delays in criminal justice undermine the credibility of the judicial system and violate the fundamental rights of individuals subjected to criminal proceedings.
Faced with this situation, various legislative reforms attempted to alleviate these deficiencies, although without directly addressing the instruction periods. However, it was the Organic Law 41/2015, of October 5, that for the first time introduced specific regulation on the duration of the instruction, establishing time limits to ensure greater efficiency and speed in the criminal process. This reform, while representing a significant advancement, was subject to criticism from doctrine, jurisprudence, and legal practitioners, leading to a new reform in 2020 with Organic Law 2/2020.
Organic Law 41/2015, of October 5, introduced a crucial modification to Article 324 of the LeCrim. This reform was born with the explicit objective of putting an end to the habitual practice of endless instructions and ensuring greater procedural speed, adhering to the principles of procedural economy and effective judicial protection. The 2015 reform introduced for the first time a specific time limit for the instruction phase:
While the 2015 reform represented a step towards a faster and more effective criminal process, several problems emerged in its practical application. Firstly, the six-month time limit for non-complex cases proved insufficient in most instances, leading to excessive use of the extension mechanism. This resulted in many investigations, in practice, continuing beyond the initially established periods, weakening the original objective of the reform.
Additionally, the declaration of nullity of proceedings conducted outside the period was not clearly provided for, generating significant debates in jurisprudence. Some judicial decisions allowed proceedings carried out after the period to be valid if they did not substantially affect the fundamental rights of the investigated individuals. This situation led to fragmentation in the interpretation and application of the norm, increasing legal uncertainty.
Another criticized aspect was the role of the Public Prosecutor in requesting extensions. It was often argued that the intervention of the Public Ministry was not sufficiently defined in the law, granting a wide margin of discretion to the investigating judge to decide on extending periods without rigorous control by the parties.
In light of the criticisms and practical difficulties arising from the 2015 reform, the legislator enacted Organic Law 2/2020, of July 27, which again modified Article 324 of the LeCrim. This reform introduced a series of changes aimed at clarifying and strengthening control over instruction periods, to prevent the perpetuation of indefinite investigations and ensure greater procedural speed. Among the main aspects of the reform are:
Since the implementation of the 2020 reform, the Supreme Court has issued multiple pronouncements addressing the implications of the nullity of proceedings conducted outside the period. Judgment 455/2021, of May 27, categorically establishes that proceedings conducted after the established period are null and, therefore, cannot be invoked in the procedure. This decision has sparked debate in doctrine and jurisprudence about the scope of this nullity and its application in various procedural situations.
Two opposing positions exist in the jurisprudential field:
These divergences have been evidenced in subsequent judgments, such as 836/2021 and 176/2023, where the Supreme Court has discussed the validity of proceedings agreed upon outside the period, as well as the possible defenselessness of the investigated individual in these cases.
One of the most controversial points in the application of Article 324 is the treatment of the statement of the investigated individual. Despite the 2020 reform establishing limitations on conducting proceedings outside the period, the statement of the investigated has sparked debate about its validity in situations of extension. The Public Prosecutor's Office, in its Circular 1/2021, argues that the statement is an essential element of the process and that its absence is not grounds for dismissal, promoting its practice regardless of the periods.
However, this interpretation has been questioned in the criminal sphere, and several defense attorneys have argued that the statement of the investigated must respect the periods imposed by Article 324, and that any statement made outside these periods would be null and, therefore, inadmissible as evidence.
The evolution of Article 324 of the LeCrim, from its reform in 2015 to its subsequent modification in 2020, represents a constant effort by the legislator to provide greater speed and efficiency to the Spanish criminal process, without neglecting the protection of the fundamental rights of the investigated individuals. Although both reforms have introduced significant improvements, the interpretation and application of instruction periods remain a complex area, subject to legal debates and the evolution of jurisprudence.
In short, Article 324 continues to be a focus of attention for both the courts and doctrine, as its correct application is essential to guarantee a balance between procedural speed and the adequate defense of the parties' rights. As jurisprudence continues to develop, it is foreseeable that many aspects that still generate uncertainty will be clarified, thus contributing to greater legal certainty in the field of the Spanish criminal process.